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I. Introduction

ater supply is increasingly threatened by climate
change throughout the West, especially in California.
Although California has started regulating groundwater use, the state’s current efforts are not likely sufficient
to adapt to an ever warming climate.1 California’s latest legal
efforts are needed, but are lacking because “it will take years to
craft and implement the management plans, the full effect of the
regulations — the recovery of…over-pumped basins — won’t be
felt until at least 2040.”2
Meanwhile, recent climate change research predicts that
evapotranspiration will increase seven percent in the immediate future.3 By 2050, the
median snowpack could
be one-third smaller
than historical medians,
and by 2100 it could be
two-thirds smaller.4 Such
drastic losses in snowmelt
will yield less runoff to
refill reservoirs leading to
more frequent droughts.
Other statistics show that
by 2100, there may only be a ten percent chance that California’s
snowpack will equal today’s average accumulation.5
Considering the dire straits of California’s water supply, current legal responses to droughts in the West will fail to respond
to worsening droughts because western water law is premised
on the assumption that current water use can be maintained.6
However, in an unstable climate, that assumption is no longer
valid.7 Under prior appropriation, water rights are maintained as
long as water use is deemed “beneficial.”8 Although “beneficial
use” is considered through the rate and amount of water used,
such analysis is still limited to categorical definitions without
contextual consideration.9 California and the western United
States must reconsider the “beneficial use” requirement to adapt
to climate change as such treatment is not sustainable in a time
of ever-increasing droughts.
This Article begins with an explanation of California’s current water use, how the current drought threatens water use, and
how climate change will ensure more disastrous drought. A history of development of western water law is offered to describe
the current situation. This leads to a discussion of three spectrums of western water law: California’s recognizance of both
riparian and prior appropriation, Colorado’s, recognizance of
only prior appropriation, and Kansas’ adoption of several unique

legal mechanisms to address drought. The Article concludes by
urging that current western water law is not sufficiently prospective for more frequent droughts, but California water law can
shift into a temporal, circumstance-oriented requirement if it
changes from its current static “beneficial use” requirement.

II. The Golden, Unsustainable State
California, the Golden State, is aptly named because of
its historic gold resources that precipitated the mass migration
towards the American West.10 In addition to gold, California also
has enticing natural splendor, accessible ports, and agricultural
productivity, developing it into the eighth largest economic
engine in the world. 11
California, recognized as
the most productive agricultural state in the United
States,12 leads the nation in
production of various crops
including almonds, grapes,
and tomatoes among others.13 All of the aforementioned resources, from gold
to crops, require water
extraction, transportation,
and sustenance, making “…California’s very existence…premised on epic liberties taken with water.”14 While California’s
precious water resources should be protected, recent events have
shown that is not the case.
California’s water use is immense, wasteful, and, possibly
worst of all, unmonitored.15 California, mostly a mixture of dry
desert and Mediterranean climate, must divert approximately
forty-three million acre-feet annually from melting snowpack
and groundwater.16 Sixty percent of those acre-feet come from
reservoirs and other surface waters, while forty percent comes
from groundwater.17 Regardless of the source, an estimated

“California’s water use
is immense, wasteful,
and, possibly worst of all,
unmonitored.”
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eighty percent of California’s water use goes towards agriculture,18 mostly in the Central Valley,19 with ten and fifteen percent
of water devoted to the uniquely thirsty almond and alfalfa crops
respectively, even though a great portion of both are exported.20
Of the remaining twenty percent of the entire state’s water supply, industrial use consumes six percent, leaving fourteen percent for home and governmental usage.21 Within municipalities,
water usage is highest in wealthy neighborhoods, reaching half
of a domestic water bill in some areas when compared to lower
income areas.22 However, there is no accurate way to measure
California’s overall water use as many regions, especially the
arid Central Valley, lack water meters.23 The absence of water
meters deprives California of the ability to monitor water use
and increase conservation efforts when necessary.24
The massive water use coupled with little oversight is
proving disastrous now in an ever-warming world.25 Studies
show that “a persistent region of high atmospheric pressure
hovering over the Pacific Ocean that diverted storms away
from California” are causing the droughts.26 Such atmospheric
conditions are more likely to occur today because of higher
concentrations of tropospheric greenhouse gasses that are
warming the atmosphere.27 Furthermore, a higher frequency
of droughts is also likely because a warmer atmosphere holds
more moisture than a cooler one.28, Climate change is leading to less precipitation, thus causing California’s agriculture
to suffer, resulting in $2.2 billion in direct and indirect costs
this year, including the loss of more than seventeen thousand
seasonal and part-time jobs.29 Such losses have led the federal
government to declare all fifty-eight California counties as
“natural disaster areas.”30
California’s continuing drought from 2013 not only threatens the state’s economy, but impacts residents directly.31 In the
agricultural worker communities of southern California, particularly east Porterville in Tulare County, where temperatures hover
over one hundred degrees Fahrenheit during the summer, more
than five hundred households “cannot flush a toilet, fill a drinking
glass, wash dishes or clothes, or even rinse their hands without
reaching for a bottle or bucket.”32 Meanwhile, “[g]roundwater
levels… have plunged by sixty feet or more in some spots, and
tens of thousands of wells are in danger.”33 Aside from the inconvenience to California residents without water, the most recent
drought and future droughts will continue to threaten the lives of
agricultural workers who are influential in harvesting all of the
aforementioned crops.34 This is not simply speculation; if people
do not have access to water, it does not matter how much they
are paid if they cannot work.
To combat the lack of access to water, California began regulating groundwater use35, but these efforts neglect to factor in
the exacerbation of existing drought conditions.36 On September
16, 2014, Governor Edmund Brown signed three bills, Assembly
Bill 1739, and Senate Bills 1168 and 1319 to enable local agencies to tailor “sustainable groundwater plans” to address specific,
regional economic and environmental issues.37
Assembly Bill 1739 provides for the creation of
groundwater sustainability agencies to impose fines for
26

unreasonable water use, submit groundwater sustainability
plans to California’s Department of Water Resources (“DWR”),
require groundwater use reporting, and grant California’s State
Water Resources Control Board (“SWRCB”) the authority
to designate water basins as probationary basins if there are
groundwater overdraft problems.38 A probationary basin designation entails an interim sustainability plan with more immediate regulatory action.39
Senate Bill 1168 grants the sustainable use of groundwater
for both economic and environmental uses; directs the DWR to
designate the water needs of a water basin as a high, medium,
low, or very low priority; and requires groundwater sustainability
plans to manage all high and medium priority basins.40 Senate
Bill 1319 enables the SWRCB to designate high and medium
priority basins as probationary basins if certain criteria are met
after January 31, 2025, and removes local agencies’ authority
to implement parts of their respective sustainability plans if the
SWRCB determines that the current plan is adequate. If a plan is
adequate, then a replacement interim plan to meet or help meet
the basin’s sustainability goal is implemented.41
These newly approved bills are an improvement, but any
benefits as a result of the legal amendments are likely to be too
late because the local groundwater management agencies will
not be identified until 2017. Moreover, overdrafted groundwater
basins will not have sustainability plans until 2020; high and
medium priority basins that are not currently overdrafted will
not have their respective plans until 2022; and high and medium
priority basins are not required to obtain full sustainability until
2040.42 As these plans are developed, the western states’ water
resources are going to be further stressed,43 and California will
potentially face more water shortages.44 None of the bills address
how California will mitigate the demands of vested water rights
in the face of an ever-decreasing supply of water. Proposition 145,
approved on November 4, 2014, may help alleviate water supply
issues with $7.545 billion in bonds being devoted to water supply infrastructure projects; however, Proposition 1 still does not
address the current problem of water rights being guaranteed in
a time of drought.46
The established and newly created legal protections surrounding water use are not sufficiently adaptable to the growing
demands of climate change, and, must therefore be reconsidered
if life in California and the western United States is to be sustained. Legal protections must be rethought because the luxury
of the status quo is lost in an ever-warming world. Therefore,
either prior appropriation’s failures are addressed voluntarily
now, or under duress in the future. Before postulating what additional legal mechanisms are necessary, one should understand
how prior appropriation came to be.

III. Western Water Law or “First in Time,
First in Right”
Prior appropriation, the western water law regime recognizing the right to divert water away from its original source,
came about because western courts wrestled with the conflict of
economic imperatives for growth and limited water resources.47
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Different western states either partially or exclusively recognize
the doctrine, and Kansas has developed unique legal tools to
accommodate recognized water rights in times of drought.48

A. The Development of the Prior Appropriation
Doctrine
The western water right doctrine that threatens California’s
future originated when gold was discovered in the high Sierras at
Sutter’s Mill on January 24, 1848.49 At the time the United States
was not exercising any right over the land or water despite its
recent purchase,50 leaving a legal vacuum wherein the customs
of gold miners could supplant established common law.51
Under Mexican control, a communal framework administered California’s waters.52 On the other hand, the United States
borrowed the English Common Law riparian doctrine where the
right to the use stayed with the land, and riparian owners have the
right “to have a natural stream through his land continue to flow
without diminution or alteration.”53 When California became a
state, it adopted the riparian common law rules, but also retained
some water law notions from Mexico.54
The legal systems conflicted with the miners, as gold mining required both the personal acquisition of water for public
use, and the diversion of water away from its natural flow.55
Furthermore, riparian water law did not satisfy non-irrigated
agriculture because fewer than twenty inches of rainfall fall each
year west of the hundredth meridian.56
California’s Supreme Court wrestled with the conflict
of law and reality.57 The Court resolved the conflict when it
implemented the traditions of the gold miners as a model.58
Accordingly, the California Supreme Court created the prior
appropriation doctrine of “first in time, first in right” where one
attains a superior right over other claimants to use water, separate from the source, when one is first to divert the water for a
beneficial use.59 In promoting use of water for mining purposes,
the California Supreme Court stated “the right to appropriate
the waters of the streams of this State, for mining and other
purposes, has been too long settled to admit of any doubt or
discussion at this time.”60 In siding with new customs of miners,
the Court decided that it was “emphatically the law-makers, as
respects mining, upon the public lands in the State.”61
Prior appropriation soon spread eastward away from
California into the rest of the West, and numerous western states,
including Colorado and Nebraska,62 enshrined prior appropriation into their constitutions.63 In contrast, states like Kansas
opted to be guided through statutes and case law.64 The doctrine
has consistently developed that a water right requires a diversion
of water for a beneficial use, covering both what the water is used
for and how much.65 Water appropriated for a non-beneficial use
was, and still is “waste” and can be grounds for terminating a
water right.66
Intent to divert and notice of diversion are almost de facto
elements of any irrigation or other water works project, but
the diversion requirement itself has largely been marginalized
throughout the twentieth century,67 especially as in-stream beneficial uses, such as fish, wildlife habitat, and recreation, became
Fall 2015

recognized as a collateral result of the environmental movement
in the 1960s.68 It is generally agreed that “beneficial use, without waste, is the basis, measure, and limit of a water right.”69
Without a beneficial use, there is only waste and the resulting
forfeiture of a water right without a beneficial use cannot reasonably be considered a taking.70
It is unclear what exactly a beneficial use is because
most western states have no statutory guidance regarding the
requirement, leaving the beneficial use concept up to judiciary
discretion.71 Often the result is that a beneficial use is “socially
acceptable,” which allows industrial and exploitative uses of
water. However, beneficial use also extends into in-stream uses
of water and other environmental concerns.72
With beneficial use being so malleable yet crucial to water
rights, any climate change adaptation in water law must address
this definitional issue. Ironically, with “beneficial” being a
subjective and inherently value-laden term, courts and legislators could have conceived ecology to be within the beneficial
use requirement at its outset just as development is equated with
benefit. Unlike California, which recognizes both the riparian
and prior appropriation doctrine,73 Colorado rejects the riparian
doctrine outright, opting to rely solely on prior appropriation.74
This leads to a split among the western states depending on
whether they follow California’s or Colorado’s model. However,
beyond this dichotomy, unique water law mechanisms are
emerging in Kansas.75

B. California Water Law
California’s constitution guarantees its citizens the ability to
appropriate water, with the appropriation guiding it in a “manner prescribed by law.”76 Water use must be both reasonable and
beneficial, and conversely there is no right to waste water unreasonably or in a non-beneficial manner.77 California is also free
to enact laws to further limit water use to beneficial purposes.78
Thus, California’s constitution does not guarantee that one may
always have access to water, but instead only guarantees beneficial uses and directs the State to decide what distinguishes
benefit from waste.79
In 1914, California’s SWRCB oversaw the Water
Commission Act of 1914 establishing California’s modern water
permit process.80 Subsequently, the Board has broad authority to allocate water resources reasonably and prevent waste.81
When approving or transferring a water right, the Board takes
“into account all prior rights and the availability of water in the
basin.”82 Under this review, riparian users have priority over
prior appropriators.83 The SWRCB also considers flows necessary for in-stream uses such as recreation and wildlife habitat.84
The approval process entails the water appropriator’s application
specifying the “proposed project’s source, place of use, purpose,
point(s) of diversion and quantity to be diverted,” an environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act,
a public notice and comment period, and a permit granting
the water right.85 A quasi-governmental irrigation district then
monitors water use.86
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California’s courts guide the state’s water use by stressing
reasonable and beneficial purposes87, and that there is no vested
property right to waste water unreasonably.88 California’s courts
also recognize that the State may validly limit the property interest of a water right to reasonable use, going so far as allowing
the full deprivation of water rights.89
The state’s power is judicially sanctioned so far as to also
apportion waters under the public trust doctrine.90 The doctrine
says states must guarantee control and access to all its navigable
waters and submerged lands.91 The doctrine is limited to navigability, but in California the water right approval process may also
contemplate “commerce, fishing, recreation, or ecological use[s]
relating to the source stream,” to ensure that new water uses do
not interfere with the public trust or other’s lawful water rights.92
Though the doctrine is rarely used, it can impede multi-million
dollar water development projects if evoked.93
California recognizes waste as diverting an amount of water
that “exceeds the amount reasonably necessary for beneficial
purposes,” following the “general custom of the locality” as
opposed to the “most scientific method known.”94 The standard
of waste is biased towards finding no waste as general customs
serve as the litmus. Appropriators need not use the best methods
available to prevent waste.95 Instead, a party challenging a water
right only needs to demonstrate both the technological feasibility
of a less wasteful option and that such an amount still comports
with local customs.96 However, courts only stop the most overly
superfluous of water uses, as the law bends the common law to
suit utility and custom.97
California law’s inherent bias towards the utilization of all
water available and deference to custom makes the State’s existing legal framework inadequate in the face of climate change.98
This is true despite a critique of California’s recent water law
reformations.99 California’s current problems will only worsen
as local customs summarily equate agriculture and other goals
with beneficial use if local customs continue shaping what is
seen as reasonable and wasteful.
Optimists may want to turn to the public trust doctrine to
adapt to climate change, but such reliance is likely misplaced.
Though the public trust doctrine enables the state to consider
ecological and other holistic notions to ensure “the greatest number of beneficial users that the water supply can support,” the
doctrine is still “subject to the rights of those with lawful priority
to the water.”100 Even if California courts use the public trust
doctrine to prevent further unsustainable water development,
the doctrine fails to address vested, uneconomic and unsustainable water rights.101 Therefore, California must turn to solutions
beyond its current and updated water law jurisprudence to adapt
to ever more demanding droughts.

C. Colorado Water Law
If California’s own hybrid legal framework, combing riparian and prior appropriation, cannot enable the State to adapt to its
current water crisis and climate change, then perhaps it should
consider other western water law regimes. Following California’s
water law development, the United States Congress, via the 1866
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Mining Act and 1877 Desert Lands Act, approved that states and
territories can change their legal systems to develop unappropriated water on and off the federal lands secured with the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo.102 Like California, Colorado had to resolve
multiple conflicting water law doctrines at the time of its statehood.103 The conflict arose between Spanish-American settlers
who brought their communitarian approach to water law where
one’s right of access was qualified by the needs of others,104 and
early Mormon settlers who hold that groups, not individuals can
own water rights.105
The early Kansas Territorial government largely adopted
the Spanish and Mormon water law doctrines, but conflict
arose shortly after achieving statehood in 1861 when Colorado
had the choice of adopting the common law riparian doctrine
or the newly developed prior appropriation custom.106 Unlike
California where the courts simply adopted the customs of
industry to justify legal changes107, Colorado courts relied on
the newly codified support for prior appropriation in Colorado’s
constitution.108 Therefore, the Colorado Supreme Court did not
have to recognize a new legal doctrine to conclude that Colorado
was a purely prior appropriation state.109 The irony of the
Colorado’s Supreme Court decision did not escape the critical
gaze of the late Joseph Sax who described the Court’s reasoning as nothing more than, “judicial revisionism in reading the
Territorial legislature’s riparian statutes.”110
Regardless of the Colorado Supreme Court’s probable
oversight, prior appropriation was readily incorporated into “the
policy… that there should be maximum utilization of water and
that the maximum utilization doctrine be integrated into the law
of vested rights.”111 In 1884, just two years after the Court’s
endorsement of the doctrine, over a million acres of Colorado
land was irrigated due to prior appropriation’s ready ability to
secure private property rights.112 For decades, State overseers
relied on the words of individual appropriators to determine
priority and the establishment of water rights leading to many
supply problems.113 As Kansas Assistant Attorney General and
water lawyer explains:
“Most appropriators did not know how much water
they were diverting, how much they had even
claimed, or how much their lands needed…. They
had no regard whatsoever for future water needs,
and made grossly excessive claims. They posted
different claims of water to the same tract of land,
either in competition with one another or by mistake. These errors produced a problem as old as
prior appropriation itself: that of over-appropriation
where the quantities set forth in decreed water rights
vastly exceeded the supply the stream could give,
even in wet years.”114
In response, Colorado created a system of water courts
with the Water Right Determination and Administration Act of
1969.115 The Act divided Colorado into Divisions, wherein water
judges and division engineers oversee the claims of potential
appropriators and resolve disputes.116
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

Today, a water right applicant provides the division’s water
clerk with “a verified application setting forth facts supporting
the ruling sought,” including showing all the elements of prior
appropriation.117 Afterwards, “the appropriator can receive a
judicially awarded final decree, with a priority backdated to the
time the ‘first step’ was taken provided that the work toward
appropriation continued with reasonable diligence.”118 Once
a final decree and a continued diversion for beneficial and
reasonable use is obtained, the appropriator acquires a vested
right.119 An applicant can also reach the same result by acquiring a conditional decree from a water court, which enables an
appropriator to acquire a priority date on a yet to be completed
waterworks project.120
Once such a right is acquired, Colorado’s courts rely on the
State’s constitution to give an inordinate amount of deference
towards protecting that right from governmental interference.121
The Colorado Supreme Court has held that these constitutional
provisions are meant to preserve the prior appropriation system
rather than conserve water
for the public or future.122
This is not to say
that Colorado water users
are free to act without
any restraints. Like every
western state, one can
only obtain a water right
through prior appropriation if the water diverted is
“of a specified quantity of
water to an actual beneficial use.”123 Groundwater
is also included within the
“beneficial” and “reasonable” use requirements
that must be maintained
lest a water right be divested.124 However, it is not always
apparent what qualifies as a beneficial use because Colorado
lacks extensive statutory guidance.125 The State’s constitution
does provide that domestic, agricultural, and manufacturing
purposes are beneficial uses, but otherwise leaves the definition
of beneficial use to court discretion.126 Storage itself is not a
beneficial use, though subsequent usage is, and neither is an
excessive water diversion, though that is almost by definition
unreasonable as well.
Colorado’s water courts grant such deference to applicants
that they rarely find a non-beneficial or unreasonable use. Water
rights are frequently divested or limited as between complaining
plaintiffs and defendants,127 but courts still grant water rights
when the application is late or when collateral business documents are not properly filed.128 Interstate compacts, retroactive
legislation, or “the uncontrolled discretion of state engineers”
will not limit water rights in Colorado.129
It is because of Colorado’s policy of maximized water use,
with an extreme amount of deference towards appropriators,
that its water law provides no help to adapt to climate change

demands.130 In Colorado, “[a] decreed priority to the use of
water for irrigation is not only a property right, it is a freehold.”131 But with drought conditions throughout the West predicted to worsen, a Colorado water right will soon be a freehold
in nothing.132 In finding categorical beneficial uses with little
to no judicial scrutiny, Colorado’s legal regime is a race to the
bottom, with every appropriator driving his straw down to get
the last drop. Colorado’s current water law regime is deficient in
the face of climate change and more adaptable methods should
be planned.

D. Kansas Water Law
Kansas has adopted several novel legal adaptations to
drought that may be extendable to other western states. After
entering statehood in 1861, Kansas adopted riparian common
law,133 and then recognized prior appropriation via statute in
1876.134 Thus, Kansas subscribes to the California doctrine,
continuing to recognize the riparian doctrine alongside prior
appropriation today. 135
State courts refused to
solely recognize prior
appropriation even as
Kansas’ Division of Water
R e s o u r c e s ( “ DW R ” )
was forming in 1917.136
However, after the ravaging Dust Bowl of the
1930s, prior appropriation
and deeper wells grew
into higher esteem as
water resources became
more critical to economic
security.137
The doctrine did not
receive constitutional
regard as it did in other
states138, but Kansas recognized that prior appropriation was
necessary to develop the western half of the state and accordingly passed the Kansas Water Appropriation Act (“KWAA”) of
1945, extending prior appropriation to all waters, both surface
and groundwater.139 The KWAA also recognized water rights
as property rights, provided the mechanism for acquiring new
water rights, designated waters rights established by or before
June 28, 1945 as vested rights, and granted the chief engineer the
ultimate authority over the enforcement of rights and allocation
of water resources “for the benefits and beneficial uses of all of
its inhabitants,” not just water right owners.140 The 1957 KWAA
amendments further protected interests of water appropriators
through classification of impairment as an unreasonable interference or degradation of the water’s quality “beyond a reasonable
economic limit.”141
As a result of the KWAA, Kansas now administers water
rights similarly to other western states.142 Applicants must state
that they wish to divert water for a reasonable beneficial use
and then have the chief engineer and Kansas’ DWR perform an

“The Colorado Supreme
Court has held that these
constitutional provisions are
meant to preserve the prior
appropriation system rather
than conserve water for the
public or future.”
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inspection before a certificate guaranteeing the water right’s priority date is issued.143 Applicable beneficial uses are enumerated
as fourteen distinct categories, most of them entailing domestic,
irrigation, and industrial uses of water.144 When two conflicting
appropriators have the same priority, favored beneficial uses will
have priority.145 Today, like California, Kansas devotes eightyfive percent of its water towards agriculture.146 However, the
chief engineer may suspend a water right if the use becomes
so excessive as to be unreasonable and wasteful.147 Factors
considered when determining if a water use constitutes waste
include, but are not limited to, minimum desirable streamflows,
groundwater recharge rate, the priority of exiting claims, and the
amount of each competing claim.148
Unfortunately, this legal system alone leads to frequent
overdraw problems.149 Kansas statutes do not further define
“beneficial use” or “waste,” and its view of impairment is rooted
in economics as opposed to a hydrology.150 Consider all of that
with an overzealous desire to develop the State’s water, and the
cruel irony of the KWAA becomes apparent. The KWAA allows
an exponential increase in the number of granted rights, 151 even
though the law was enacted with the purpose of preventing overdrawing of groundwater.152 Since the KWAA’s enactment, water
right applications increased from 334 between 1945 and 1950 to
5,730 during the 1950s, 6,433 during the 1960s, and 16,226 in
the 1970s.153 However, none of those numbers accurately indicate the amount of water the State uses, as the chief engineer
does not need to be informed of domestic wells.154 Meanwhile,
the Ogallala Aquifer, the main source for appropriated water in
the State, went from three percent depletion in 1960 to thirty
percent depletion today.155 As such, agriculture does not receive
the majority of water appropriation, as much as it is mined,156
with the Ogallala Aquifer predicted to be sixty nine percent
depleted by 2060.157
In response to these depletion trends, Kansas has created
three legal innovations, unique to western states, to address
drought and declining water reserves.158 The first legal innovation was the chief engineer’s new authority, granted in 1978,
to designate certain areas as intensive groundwater use control areas (“IGUCA”).159 The chief engineer may establish an
IGUCA upon his or her own volition, or under his or her discretion after the requisite amount of demand within a groundwater
management district, a multi-county governmental within the
DWR.160 The conditions necessary for the formation of an
IGUCA include when:
“(a) Groundwater levels in the area in question are
declining or have declined excessively; or (b) the rate
of withdrawal of groundwater within the area in question equals or exceeds the rate of recharge in such
area; or (c) preventable waste of water is occurring or
may occur within the area in question; (d) unreasonable deterioration of the quality of water is occurring
or may occur within the area in question; or (e) other
conditions exist within the area in question which
require regulation in the public interest.”161
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Eight such IGUCAs are now existent using the aforementioned basis.162 Once established, the chief engineer may preempt all new water rights applications, set a permissible total
groundwater withdrawal level, reduce the amount of permissible
groundwater withdrawal, require a rotation in groundwater use,
or any necessary provision to “protect the public interest.”163
Second, in 1991 the Kansas Legislature granted the chief
engineer the authority to require water right applicants to formulate a conservation plan to preserve water resources.164 Such
authority is discretionary, and can only be evoked if there is a
finding that the conservation plan will “assure public benefit and
promote public interest.”165
Third, and most recently in 2012, the Kansas Legislature
enabled local communities to establish stricter water use standards in Local Enhanced Management Areas (“LEMA”).166
Whenever an area within a groundwater management district is
designated as an IGUCA, community members, who presumably realize that their unregulated actions threaten the common
groundwater resource, may restrict their water rights within further circumscribed areas in the IGUCA. Entering into a LEMA
is completely voluntary, and subject to the chief engineer’s
approval.167
All of Kansas’ efforts to adapt to drought and dwindling
resources are commendable, but likely will be insufficient in
light of climate change. IGUCAs allow established, yet still
unsustainable, agricultural practices to continue, never questioning if water usage is truly beneficial if it is being applied to
thirsty corn.168 Enabling the chief engineer to require conservation plans likewise sounds promising, but being subject to the
complete discretion of the chief engineer makes the measure
almost meaningless when the chief engineer’s discretion is
biased through the long standing myth that western water use
can and should be maximized. Personal views also undermine
the LEMA efforts, for as long as they entirely voluntary then it
will always be immediately more economical for an individual
appropriator to continue drilling, rather than limit his or her own
use with the hope that neighbors will do likewise.169
With recent legal adaptations to drought being lackluster,
the inherent problems with prior appropriation are not addressed.
Beneficial use in Kansas is still categorically defined, waste is
practically undefined as unreasonable as measured by custom,
and water rights still implicitly assume that a finite resource can
be extracted ad infinitum. Current Kansas political leadership is
unlike to address a response to any of those problems in prior
appropriation are not as it is now legitimately considering the
construction of an aqueduct, bringing the Missouri River to
Dodge City170 despite the legal and technical infeasibility of
such an endeavor.171 Therefore, none of the currently existing
models of water law can remedy California’s water woes, in of
themselves. Instead, the problems inherent in prior appropriation
must be addressed to adapt to climate change, and new legal
approaches should be considered.
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IV. A Climate Change Adaptive Water Law
Prior appropriation developed not as a logical extension of
established common law, but as a discrete, unprecedented incident to accommodate the needs and desires of early California
miners and farmers.172 As such, prior appropriation implicitly
assumed that water could be utilized like any hard or soft rock
mineral, with extraction levels remaining relatively constant.
This system of water allocation may have seemed appropriate from the latter half of the nineteenth century and into the
twentieth as the population of western U.S. cities exploded173;
however, with the circumstances surrounding climate change
becoming grimmer.
It is clear that prior appropriation relies on false assumptions when the circumstances surrounding climate change
become grimmer. It is reasonable to foresee more climate change
induced drought, which will increasingly stress a resource that is
consistently dropping in supply.174 As there are no expectations
that the West’s water supply will increase, water supply, agricultural productivity, and
other economic endeavors,
are inversely related and
antagonistic towards each
other.175 Thus prior appropriation, which enables
resource exploitation
based on temporal priority,
is doomed to drain what
water remains.176
Prior appropriation
must adapt if life, not just
agriculture, in the western
United States is to be
sustained. Expanding the
legal conceptions of beneficial use from a categorical, individual
viewpoint to a more societal, ecological one will help make this
trend occur.

the curtailment of water rights because, “the protection and
conservation of the natural resources of the state [is] in the general welfare and serve[s] a public purpose, and so constitute[s]
a reasonable exercise of the police power.”182 Relying on that
justification, a California appellate court reasons that, “a diversion of water may be for a purpose ‘beneficial’ in some respect
. . . does not make such use ‘reasonable’ when compared with
demands, or even future demands, for more important uses.”183
Likewise, the Ninth Circuit Appellate Court agrees that the
“beneficial use [requirement] expresses a dynamic concept,
which is a ‘variable according to conditions’, and therefore
over time.”184 Even the Idaho Supreme Court recognizes that
“conditions might so change that [previously acceptable uses]
would be an unjustifiable use of water needed for other purposes.”185 Thus, the concept of beneficial need not be limited
to the status quo.
The fluid nature of beneficial use should not be controversial. Prior appropriation was itself a seemingly unprecedented
legal change that was necessary at the time.186 Both
the benef icial use and
waste doctrines of water
law have even changed
over time, finding new
uses of water not to be
waste as the new methods
became accepted over
time. 187 Similar to how
the “the morality of an act
is a function of the state of
the system at the time it
is performed,” the reasonableness, wastefulness, or
benefit of a water project
cannot be measured unconditionally.188 Rather, the water right
approval process can and should consider that water projects
that were once beneficial may no longer be so today.
This view of beneficial use envisions no categorical definitions of beneficial uses. Beneficial use should instead “weigh
relative values and priorities.”189 Accordingly, agricultural,
industrial, and similar water uses are not treated as de facto
beneficial. Instead, individual state statutes may direct state engineers and agencies to consider future water needs before deeming a use beneficial and entitled to a water right. State courts may
also act by finding proposed and current water usages wasteful,
just as the courts recognized that once non-beneficial uses could
become beneficial.190
State statutes could also entail ranking certain crops, providing deference to more water efficient crops, and designating
other crops as wasteful based on the state where appropriators
wish to grow them. For example, corn in western Kansas may
be unreasonable in a drought, while wheat production may be
beneficial.191 In California, some crop productions may never
again be considered beneficial as the effects of climate change
worsen.192 Since “the right to water in the West is premised upon

“It is clear that prior
appropriation relies on
false assumptions when
the circumstances
surrounding climate change
become grimmer.”

A. Adapting Prior Appropriation
Case law and precedent supports the changing the nature of
the beneficial use element of prior appropriation.177 As long as a
water right is reasonably utilized for a statutorily approved, judicially sanctioned, or constitutionally protected use, then the use
is not waste178, and the water right is not subject to forfeiture.179
The amount of water diverted must still be reasonable, but the
reasonableness of a water project’s use is not judged.
Extremely water intensive agricultural projects can continue
because they are agricultural. Prior appropriation’s shortsightedness is not surprising, considering that the doctrine was designed
to do nothing more guarantee property rights with maximal
water use.180 Such certainty is no longer possible in a changing climate. One need only look at California’s current drought
to understand the prior appropriation doctrine’s inflexibility to
satisfy climate change’s ecological demands.181
Despite prior appropriation’s inherent problems, it is
important to note that the California Supreme Court justifies
Fall 2015
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use,” then already established, and unsustainable, water rights
may be rightfully forfeited once the water use is deemed to be no
longer beneficial.193
Western states should adopt this more holistic consideration of beneficial use. California’s constitution allows for
water rights to be circumscribed by statute, and California’s
courts recognize that beneficial use need not be a static
trait.194 Idaho,195 Washington,196 Montana,197 New Mexico,198
Wyoming, 199 North Dakota, 200 South Dakota, 201 and
Nebraska202 are similarly situated, and thus can likewise adopt
a context specific concept of beneficial use. In Kansas there
is no reason to believe that beneficial use could not be further
redefined because water rights therein have repeatedly been
restricted by statute.203 For the same reason, a context specific
beneficial use doctrine should be applicable in Oregon,204
Nevada,205 Utah,206 and Oklahoma.207 Of course, there are
limitations to this argument.

B. Impediments to Adaptation
Impediments to adaptations will come from takings claims,
the particularities of individual states, and the subjective nature
of the word “beneficial.” As water rights are property rights, any
infringement is likely to
run against takings claims
arguments. 208 Wielding
the Fifth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, protesters are likely to claim
that changing the conception of beneficial use will
result in property takings
without just compensation.209 However, any such
takings claims in retaliation of the new beneficial
use criteria are more than
likely to fail.210
Changing the meaning of beneficial use is not likely to
violate the first per se taking example, as a water right is not a
property interest in the water itself.211 Instead, a water right is
a usufructuary right, entitling only the right to access a certain
amount of water.212 As the first per se taking involves the state
occupying a physical property interest, not usufructuary, this
analysis is inapplicable.213 This result is true also for the second
per se taking example of deprivation of economic value.214
To determine whether a diminution of economic value is a
per se taking, a court must also balance the economic impact
of the regulation on the property owner, the government’s interference in the property owner’s expectations, and the reasoning
behind the regulation.215 However, this analysis is tailored by
an “extremely deferential” view in favor of the governmental
action.216 As long as there is a reasonable basis for the regulation, it is likely to be sustained. As changing the nature of beneficial use most definitely has a reasonable basis, it will not be seen
as a taking per se.

Regarding the final form of a takings claim, undue total forfeiture is found when all economically beneficial use of a property interest is extinguished as a result of governmental action. A
regulation or other enactment with such an effect can survive the
total forfeiture analysis “only if the logically antecedent inquiry
into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed
use interests were not part of his title to begin with.”217 The
governmental limitation “must inhere in the title itself,” being
a mere extension of already existing limitations in the property
interest in question and established property law.218
Though altering beneficial use may manifest as new legislation or state constitutional decree, such changes are still
a logical extension of the reason behind the beneficial use
requirement. Furthermore, the beneficial use requirement is
inherent in a water right’s title and within the background of
every western state’s property jurisprudence.219 Therefore, the
creation of a climate adaptive prior appropriation scheme, even
when it restrains “pre-existing uses of rights that were legal
when initiated,” should not constitute an unconstitutional taking in any sense.220
As for the particularities of individual states, a re-envisioned
beneficial use requirement will not likely be implemented in
Colorado, Arizona, and
Texas. Colorado’s water
law jurisprudence is so
deferential to appropriators that any new restrictions on obtaining water
rights will first have to
address the state’s constitution.221 This is also true for
Arizona, since the Arizona
Supreme Court found the
retroactivity of a beneficial
use statute upon vested
water rights unconstitutional.222 Texas provides additional and
unique challenges because, even if the climate change adaptive
beneficial use doctrine was adopted, the State applies the rule
of capture to groundwater while wholly ignoring the reasonable
use doctrine.223 Thus, to adopt a holistic beneficial use to save
groundwater during drought, Texas will have to statutorily abrogate its history of treating water like oil and gas224.
Finally, the last foreseeable legal impediment to adapting
the western water right regime for a warming climate is the
subjective nature of the word “beneficial” itself. Even if water
law statutes across the West are accordingly amended, state
water courts and agencies may still further the implicit bias
of progress within natural resources law. Though flood irrigation, or luxury crops, in a drought may not seem beneficial to
an environmentalist, they still are to administrative agencies.
Therefore, these conflicting views may lead to implementation
problems within individual states, and eventually inconsistencies among western states.
However, such problems can be remedied by articulate
drafting that demonstrates what “beneficial use” is meant to

“If the western model
rights model does not
voluntarily change now,
it will have to be coerced
to do so in the future.”
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further: the survival of western water resources. Courts may
aid in this matter by rightfully construing prior appropriation
statutes in line with long standing precedent that “beneficial
use” need not be a categorical attribute.225 The fact that climate
change is drastically reducing the availability of water resources
makes any conflicting views on beneficial use irrelevant. If the
western model rights model does not voluntarily change now, it
will have to be coerced to do so in the future.

V. Conclusion
Prior appropriation may have built the West, but prior appropriation’s success relies upon a constant climate, an assumption
that is no longer reasonable. The late economist Garrett Hardin
lamented that “[t]he law, always behind the times, requires elaborate stitching and fitting to adapt it to this newly perceived aspect
of the commons.”226 Here, to preserve the commons of water
and agriculture in America’s west, prior appropriation must be
“stitched” to adapt to climate change. California’s current legal
structure is promising, but the existence of California’s current
drought problems exemplifies how the current state of the law is
insufficient. Also, California’s recently enacted amendments will
take too long to implement and do not speak to the issue of satisfying vested water right demands as the water supply is continually depleted. Colorado’s water law regime of prior appropriation
is also not likely to assist the rest of the West considering its
extremely deferential stance towards maximized appropriation.
As for Kansas, its efforts should be commended, but is unlikely
to produce substantially better results because water rationing
remains voluntary and the State believes that continuous growth
is possible.

Instead, California, and the rest of the West, can readily
adapt to climate change by utilizing an equally adjustable definition of beneficial use. This new vision of beneficial use will
encompass environmental factors and the sustained continuation
of state economies, not just what the water is used for and how
much water is used. Thus, the water rights that vest outmoded
and unnecessary water projects will be lost to make room for
new diversions.
A climate adaptive beneficial use requirement can be
adopted easily via statute in California and other states that
shape the guarantees of prior appropriation with statutes and
judicial oversight. However, such a solution is not likely to
work in Colorado, where its water court system seemingly
demands that water reserves be drained; Arizona, where the
State’s Supreme Court has strictly interpreted Arizona’s authority over established water rights; and Texas, which applies the
rule of capture to ground water. It is improbable that creating
a more holistic beneficial use element will be free of implementation inconstancies as “[t]he irrigation lobby still has a
few things going for it, mainly sentimentality, tradition, and
law.”227 Thus, subjective biases will always determine what is
considered a beneficial use.
Nonetheless, the legal conception of beneficial use must
change, not “should.” The West simply does not have enough
water to maintain constant economic growth and to keep farmworker communities alive.228 Climate change will foreseeably
deprive California’s Central Valley, the United States’ hearth of
agriculture, of one of life’s most basic necessities.229 In a way,
this will be a fitting end; prior appropriation, at least as it conceived today, may begin to die in the state where it was erratically conceived.
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